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Abstract 
Infrastructure development is one of the constraints to the economic development of sub-Saharan Africa. 
The region needs to invest in excess of US$68bn by 2020 to bridge the gap in the current core infrastructure 
areas of energy, transport, water and information and communications technology. Governments are 
therefore pursuing strategies that include Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for core infrastructure 
services. This structure involves contracting the private sector to develop and deliver services that would 
traditionally be the responsibility of the state. In return the private sector retains rights to all revenue related 
to the service provision under defined terms with the government. Equitable risk allocation, funding structure 
and contract enforcement are some of the key characteristics of effective PPP programmes and growing 
private sector investment into the sector.  
The investment risk profile of PPP projects is fairly similar in structure to that of typical project finance 
transactions with the added complexity of the dynamics introduced by public sector policy and politics. 
Understanding the risk profile of sub-Saharan Africa projects is essential to growth in the sector. Through 
the literature, the critical risk elements are identifiable and further study into their relevance to sub-Saharan 
Africa investors and market observers is what this research pursued. These include the state project 
preparation processes, governance, legislation, political stability, operational and market risk. The research 
focused primarily on identifying and analysing those elements in the risk profile that are having significant 
negative impact on the growth of private sector investment participation and in turn the wider adoption of 
the PPP strategy in infrastructure provision. Further to this was the identification of viable recommendations 
the industry could implement to improve investor participation. 
The research was conducted through structured interviews with market participants, reflecting on the trends 
data, reports, a selected few project cases and academic studies found in the literature relevant for the risk 
elements identified. It was found that the lack of sound project selection and preparation processes and 
poor legislative and regulatory environment were the two highest inherent risks in sub-Saharan Africa 
impeding the development of infrastructure PPPs. Respondents highlighted the need to establish well 
governed and resourced PPP agencies responsible for the legislation and regulation of PPP projects. 
Technical and operational risk management did not concern investors as much as issues with dealing with 
the political and social dynamics the projects are exposed to. Successful projects in the region are 
characterised by sound preparation with experienced transaction advisors leading to an equitable risk 
allocation structure, good governance and availability of support and guarantees against political risk and 
breach of contract from multilateral agencies like The World Bank.  
On-going state fragility will remain a challenge for the region in terms of poverty and political instability in 
some countries and this would affect the viability of regional integration infrastructure initiatives. The role of 
multilateral funding agencies like the African Development Bank and World Bank is essential for risk 
coverage and capacity building. Overall the improvement of planning and governing processes within the 
 
 
 
public sector procuring entities is what will result in real improvement in the risk profile of projects in the 
region and in turn the growth of PPP investment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Context of the study 
Infrastructure development has been at the top of the agenda of most African governments for 
the past few decades. Economic development, particularly growth in industrial sectors, depends 
on the availability of suitable support infrastructure such as utilities, airports, roads, and harbours. 
The development of ICT infrastructure has also become a crucial component of growth enablers 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (BMI, 2012). The issue has never been the acknowledgement of the 
infrastructure need, but more how to address factors such as financing, institutional capacity and 
other constraints that the region faces in the pursuit of infrastructure development. 
Global comparative ratings such as the Logistics performance index measuring the quality of 
trade and transport-related infrastructure place most SSA countries below the global average and 
far behind the rest of the emerging economies (WorldBank, 2013). This is largely due to poor road 
networks, limited freight rail capacity and under developed harbour operations.  
Governments have a number of options available to them when formulating service provision 
strategies for particular sectors of the economy. Infrastructure investment involves billions in 
annual capital expenditure. It also requires extensive planning, execution and operations 
technology and related resources that may not be readily available in developing countries. In the 
case of SSA, there are also structural issues that further limit the region’s ability to easily fund 
and close the deficit. One key factor is the limited fiscal capacity due to the size of these 
economies and the limited depth in local capital markets (Andrianaivo & Yartey, 2010).  
In the event that the state has limited investment capacity due to budgetary constraints and other 
institutional resource limits, markets are more likely to see the adoption of service provision 
strategies that take the form of a partnership with the private sector, Public Private Partnerships 
(Fourie, 2001). Fourie asserted that this allows for the government to ensure service provision 
without carrying the burden of the capital outlay and decreases government expenditure and 
therefore the deficit. PPPs could be an effective way for the public sector to access private sector 
capital and technical resources. 
The extent of the infrastructure deficit is well researched by multilateral funding agencies like the 
African Development Bank (AfDB). Intergovernmental political structures like The New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) were founded to address the need for consistency 
in regional policy creation and integration, especially for the implementation of development 
initiatives (Von Bratt, 2003). The establishment of The Programme for Infrastructure Development 
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in Africa (PIDA) through the AfDB and NEAPD followed to find ways to bridge the gap and outline 
priorities. PIDA currently estimates the budget cost to develop the identified PIDA projects by 
2040 alone stands at US$340bn with the urgent need to fund the US$68bn of priority projects to 
2020. Energy and Transport networks account for 97% of the 2020 plan, see Figure 1 below 
(AfDB & Nepad, 2013). However, it has been found that domestic capital markets (both Public 
and Private) have real limitations in the medium term to meet the funding demand (Kodongo, 
2013).  
Figure 1: Priority PIDA projects funding requirements, 2020 in billions of US$ 
 
 
In order to keep up with demand levels and growth, SSA needs to spend in excess of $93bn 
annually while, 2011 estimates of annual spend measured at US43bn (AfBD, 2011). 
The PIDA programme recognises the need to co-opt the private sector in the implementation of 
the strategy. Consider that at the peak of the global investment cycle before the 2008 crisis, Africa 
only accounted for 5.2% of the overall global FDI inflow, this amounted to only US$ 64bn, with 
almost 24% targeting North Africa (Cleeve, 2012). These low Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
figures for SSA may indicate a general lack of investor interest in long term investment in the 
region. There needs to be a larger and more focused effort to bring in private sector investment 
into Africa and especially into the infrastructure sector. 
Due consideration of effective Public Private Partnership (PPP) structures in the priority sectors 
is needed. Generally an effective PPP in the infrastructure environment is characterised as one 
which results in accelerated project development and construction, completed within the budgeted 
cost and ensured effective risk transfer to the private sector (Murphy, 2008).  
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PPP’s have been implemented with varying degrees of success in countries across the world 
such as Germany, United States, India and others (Benković, Milosavljević, & Barjaktarović-
Rakočević, 2010; Mahalingam, 2011; Sarangi, 2002). Researchers have attempted to discern 
and group the critical success factors that aid in the effective execution of the strategy. These 
factors are; a favourable investment climate, economic viability of the project, a reliable 
concession consortium with strong technical capability, a sustainable funding strategy, effective 
risk transfer, strong contract agreements and the reliability of enforcing such agreements (Zhang, 
2005). Upon further investigation of the significance of each of these factors, Zhang concluded 
that economic viability and risk transfer were the most significant for successful implementation 
of PPPs.  
Private sector involvement in infrastructure is growing;  World Bank Development Indicators data 
reported increases in infrastructure related investments including the private sector in South Africa 
and other SSA economies since 2000 (WorldBank, 2013). Studies have explored the options to 
bridge the  funding gap, such as direct government bond issues and bonds linked to an 
infrastructure index (Kodongo, 2013). 
Practise would dictate that private investors evaluate infrastructure development the same way 
they would other investment opportunities available to them. To perform a proper appraisal, they 
must clearly understand the nature of the risks that they face in such investments and how they 
evolve in terms of allocation throughout the project life cycle illustrated below.  
Figure 2: Project Life Cycle1 
 
 
The Feasibility Study2 (step 2) is a significant step in the process for the following key reasons: 
                                               
1 Project Development Process as defined in the South African National Treasury PPP Manual, 2004 
2 The South African National Treasury PPP Manual emphasises the importance of a detailed Feasibility 
study supported by qualified and experienced transaction advisors. The approval of PPPs by Treasury is 
1. Project 
Inception
2. Feasibility 
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3. 
Procurement
4. Negotiation 
and Financial 
Close
5. Project 
Development 
6. Project 
Delivery 
(O&M)
7. Exit/Close-
Out/Transfer
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i. The feasibility study sets out the main objectives and output requirements of the initiative 
ii. It tests the cost-to-benefit of each implementation option available 
iii. At this point, it is determined what level of risk transfer is envisaged by the public sector 
iv. It sets out the methodology for the roll-out process along with all required support 
resources 
How would the risk management process work throughout the life cycle of the project? The 
process is underpinned by the 3 main steps; 
i. Risk identification and evaluation – the core elements of risk that exist through the life 
cycle of the PPP 
ii. Risk ownership – effective allocation of risk between the parties of the PPP 
iii. Risk mitigation strategies – considerations of the mitigation measures 
It is important to note that Risk Identification and Risk Ownership are all determined through the 
internal process of the PPP originator or procuring entity.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
This study seeks to identify the critical investment risks in SSA PPP initiatives that directly affect 
investor appetite. Africa is pegged as the next frontier for growth and opportunity, yet attempts at 
coordinated regional integration and development initiatives have struggled to gain momentum 
and the infrastructure deficit is expanding (AfBD, 2011). The AfDB agrees that private sector 
participation is needed as an integral part of the solution. If there is a misalignment of private 
sector perception and expectation and government policy and process, it should be assessed, 
quantified where possible, and addressed.  
Detailed studies of related risk considerations in environments and transactions similar to this are 
those focused on project finance risk identification and evaluation (Einowski & Roek, 2007; Gatti, 
Rigamonti, Saita, & Senati, 2007; Warkentin, 1997). From these studies completed, reasonable 
inference can be made about the main risk factors applicable to similar project structures. 
Possible risk mitigation strategies in funding, development and operations are well documented, 
though the limits of their effectiveness in SSA have not been fully studied (El-Diraby, 2006). 
The literature lacks direct contextualised and qualitative studies detailing what investors already 
in SSA and those looking for emerging market opportunities consider as the current barriers to 
                                               
contingent on sufficient due diligence and comparative analysis of potential investor interest and effective 
risk transfer.  
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entry or substantial risks when reviewing prospects in bulk SSA infrastructure projects in the form 
of PPPs. There is also a gap in understanding the limitations imposed by legacy socio-political 
issues on PPP development potential.  
1.3 Objectives of the study  
The main objective of the study is to identify and analyse relevant investment risk factors in 
infrastructure PPPs in SSA. The study will also assess the effectiveness of existing best practise 
mitigation strategies and, where possible, recommend ways to pre-emptively mitigate dominant 
risk issues for investors during project feasibility considerations.  
The following core questions will be considered in pursuit of these objectives; 
i. What PPP structures are suitable for financing bulk infrastructure in the SSA 
region?  
ii. What are the significant risks faced by potential infrastructure PPP investors in 
SSA? 
iii. How effective are current practise mitigation measures in the context of SSA?  
1.4 Significance of the study 
Understanding the full context of investment risk in PPPs is essential for the success of initiatives 
like the PIDA. If successful, the application of feasible recommendations that may be identified 
by this study could ensure effective risk evaluation and transfer and improve private sector 
participation in infrastructure development. Attracting investors is the first step in developing a 
thriving PPP investment market in SSA that will assist economic growth and regional integration. 
The AfDB, as the lead coordinator for PIDA has done extensive work to evaluate the extent of the 
deficit and the required solution. The Bank highlights the need to access private domestic and 
international capital. However, there is no consensus as to why this is a challenge or how to 
unlock it. This study can be used as a good starting point in understanding the dynamics limiting 
the advancement of the PPP strategy in infrastructure development which will be to the benefit of 
SSA’s economic development.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1  The Structural Forms of PPPs  
A public private partnership is a contractual agreement between a public procuring entity 
(government ministry, state owned company or agency) and a private sector entity to provide a 
service that would traditionally be provided by the government (Rebeiz, 2012).  
By Reibez’s definition, in the context of bulk infrastructure development, a PPP includes public 
procuring entity to which the service agreement is bound and a consortium of private sector 
companies likely including an engineering and construction services partner, an operator and a 
syndicate of financial institutions and investors.  
In cases where public adoption plays a key role in the success of the initiative, researchers 
advocate for the adoption of an extended Public-Private-People-Partnership or P4 framework  as 
opposed to the traditional P3 which treats the community within which the initiative is to be 
implemented as external parties to the agreement (Ng, Wong, & Wong, 2013). This approach 
would be more effective in the cases where the infrastructure in question is inclined toward social 
service provision.  
Though there are various forms of PPP contract structures and they have hardly changed since 
the formal recognition of PPP contracts in the early 1980s, the types below are far more common 
in practise herein cited as defined by (Ahwireng-Obeng & Mokgohlwa, 2002; Gatti, 2008; Rebeiz, 
2012); 
i. A lease agreement – a time bound lease to existing assets is given to the private sector 
and the private sector has rights to all revenue from the asset for the defined period. 
ii. A concession agreement: Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) – the government grants 
the rights to fully develop, operate and maintain an infrastructure asset to the private sector 
for a period, at the end of which the assets are transferred back to government.  
An added advantage of the PPP, noted by Garvin (2008), is that the funding strategy is more 
likely to detract from the traditional dependency on risk averse bond buying investors who lend to 
government limiting its dependency on fiscal support and opening up options in international 
capital markets.  
PPP form selection is a function of the desired transfer of responsibility. Research into the various 
options and related responsibilities can be summarised in the following table.. 
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Table 1: Key Responsibilities in various PPP models 
Key Characteristic Responsibilities in Different Modes of PPPs 
Modes 
Asset 
Ownership 
O&M 
Capital 
Investment 
Main 
Risk 
Bearer 
Typical 
Duration 
Management 
Contract 
Public Private Public Public 3-5yrs 
Lease 
Contract 
Public Private Public Shared 5-15yrs 
BOOT 
Public & 
Private 
Private Private Private 25-30yrs 
(Ahwireng-Obeng & Mokgohlwa, 2002; Ncube, 2010) 
2.2  Risk in PPPs 
There are various elements of risk throughout the lifecycle of PPP projects, including; technical, 
environmental, political and economic risks. Studies focusing on investment risk evaluation focus 
on the aspects of the project planning process, execution and operation that present the most 
uncertainty to the realisation of the returns expected by the investors.  
Gatti (2008), project finance literature defines 3 classes of risks. First, there are risks associated 
with the pre-completion phase which are distinct in terms of scope, causality and ownership to 
those associated with the second class grouped as post completion risk issues (following financial 
close and project commissioning). Third, there are risks that are of a global nature across the 
project life cycle. All these classes of risk either impact the cost of the inputs, time to completion 
and the cash flows during operation.  
The majority of the literature specific to PPP risk  found was focused on; the maturity of risk 
management practise (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 2012), the identification of overall PPP risk elements 
(Kong, Tiong, Cheah, Permana, and Ehrlich (2008); Warkentin, 1997) and qualitative 
assessments of successes and constraints of the use of PPPs as a strategy in different 
environments (Antoniou, 2007; Garvin, 2008; Mahalingam, 2011). Research in the field of global 
project finance however, is more specific on the areas of risk and the rationale for formulation of 
viable PPPs is based on fundamental project finance principles with the added complexity of the 
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state as the originator and guarantor. Project finance innovation is particularly important because 
it combines organisational structure with effective risk sharing (Byoun, Kim, & Yoo, 2013). 
One can group the project cycle in Figure 2: Project Life Cycle, into 2 main phases; Pre-
completion and post completion, with steps 1 to 5 representing pre-completion. This will later help 
in the definition of risk ownership and allocation through the various contractual agreements 
synonymous with PPPs.   
 
Figure 3: Risk Elements in PPP the Project Life Cycle 
Adapted from (Gatti, 2008) 
 
 
The extent to which investors believe each of these risks can be identified early on and effectively 
managed will improve the outlook for the investability of a prospective project. In this literature 
review, the focus is on studies that look into the inherent levels of these risks in SSA, and relying 
on available trends, indices and extracts from commentary in industry journals and periodicals.  
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2.3  Project Specific Risks 
2.3.1  Project Selection and Preparation Risk  
This relates to the uncertainty behind the assumptions of the project strategy overall and rests 
fully in the domain of public administrators and their processes. Starting from identification of the 
required project to eventual execution; this risk is related to causes such as the lack of skill or 
technical capacity to support project development in public institutions, limited market data to aid 
feasibility assessments, unclear legislative frameworks and ineffective governance of institutional 
programmes (Dutz, Harris, Dhingra, & Shugart, 2006; Mahalingam, 2011). This preparation 
process includes the inception, feasibility and procurement process referred to in Figure 2: Project 
Life Cycle.  
Through this process the investment parameters are defined. In many instances poor preparation 
on the part of public administrators results in failed attempts to present a marketable offer and get 
through stage 4; the procurement process. As a determinant of investability, planning gives 
investors a clear sense of the overall strategy considered and comfort that due process has been 
followed and the right input solicited. Institutional capacity is a going concern in Africa, limiting the 
depth of policy, processes and governance and adversely affecting the project selection and 
planning process (AfDB & Nepad, 2013).  
The World Bank Infrastructure PPP best practice framework recommends the creation of 
dedicated PPP oversight units within government (Dutz et al., 2006). These institutions work 
within the national governments to ensure policy consistency, clear governance and adherence 
to procedure and rule out the risks of process failure and in some instances corruption. As it 
stands South Africa, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda are a few of the African 
countries with functional PPP agencies.  
The role authority level of these units must align with best practice as shown below in Table 2 as 
a summary of the agency structures the world notes as highly effective. This highlights the 3 
functional levels a PPP unit may cover for selected reference states. 
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Table 2: PPP Agency Structures and Roles 
State 
Information & 
Guidance 
Advisory Support & Funding Approval 
 
Resource 
Centre 
Guidance 
Material 
Project 
advice 
Funding for 
preparation 
Project 
developer 
Contract 
Monitoring 
Final approval 
authority 
India: AP Infrastructure 
Authority 
Y Y Y    Y* 
Canada Y Y Y  Y Y  
Ireland Y Y Y Y Y Y** Y 
South Africa Y Y Y Y   Y 
United Kingdom Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
World Bank PPP Resource Centre 
 
Project Feasibility: The role of Transaction Advisors  
Transaction Advisor is a global term for various professional organisations that specialise in public 
administrative and planning support in terms of; programme planning and management, public 
finance and law and technical support for non-core activities like engineering and operations. 
Tough no academic literature was found relating to the input and value of financial advisors to the 
process, the South African PPP agency manual (2004) emphasised the importance of the advisor 
in their process. The Advisor can narrow the skills gap, ensure best practice preparation and 
evaluation of options for the project and setup a suitable way to engage the market later on.  
The involvement of a reputable advisor throughout the project preparation process may provide 
some comfort around the investability of the proposed project to the private sector investor. There 
is however no literature available to validate this hypothesis. Therefore, part of this research is to 
test the value investors place on this criterion. AfDB and Nepad (2013) noted that the success of 
the recent regional PPP project in power3 was notably as a result of effective preparation and 
management. 
 
 
                                               
3 “The first regional PPP power project in Africa, Ruzizi III is expected to leverage more than 50% 
commercial financing (debt and equity), with majority private ownership.. Overseen by a regional entity 
formed by the three beneficiary countries to develop projects of common interest, the framework for Ruzizi 
III has been successfully developed, despite its complex public-private structure, over a period of 18 months 
for a number of key reasons, perhaps none more important than effective project preparation and 
management” (AfDB & Nepad, 2013) 
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Project Procurement – Engaging the Market Effectively 
Part of the role of the PPP agencies is to safeguard the processes for public sector procurement 
for PPPs which gives investors a clear view of the level of protection against corruption and overall 
transparency.  
The bidding costs for the private sector are far higher than normal and duly considered before a 
consortium is put together and a bid is prepared. Therefore one would expect the level of 
confidence in the process followed by government leading up to the release of request for 
proposals to have a significant influence on investor participation in bidding. Mahalingam (2011), 
attempted to draw the link between institutional structure and capacity to PPP success. The 
author found that in the context of a developing country, the need to maintain life cycle 
involvement of the PPP agencies to ensure effective risk mitigation and continuous capacity 
building at line ministry and local level is essential.  
2.3.2  Project Development Risks 
This element encompasses these sub-elements; construction and technology risks. Infrastructure 
project development in PPPs may involve a multitude of engineers, construction contractors and 
operators. Though the feasibility process would provide details of the output and operations 
requirements, final design of the solution is left to the party assigned to carry out project 
development on behalf of the investors. For most large complex projects, the project development 
is usually contracted through lump sum turnkey contracts (Gatti, 2008). This is far more practical 
from a risk allocation perspective, to be discussed later on.  
The real risks in this category range from uncertainty on timing, performance of technology 
solutions chosen and the final budget cost. For the party allocated this risk, main concerns would 
include; dispute resolution mechanisms, quality of labour and industrial relations stability, 
payment risk, security and unrest, logistical planning, design suitability, health risks (tropical 
diseases etc.), local corruption and even lack of support infrastructure (utilities) (Ahwireng-Obeng 
& Mokgohlwa, 2002; Backhaus & Werthschulte, 2006; Bain, 1996). These authors cite these risks 
as varying in significance depending on the maturity of the business environment under 
consideration, the complexity of the project and experience of the selected counterparties 
involved in project development. 
For the investor there are a few global risk management options that can be applied to manage 
project development risk (Bain, 1996; Gatti, 2008). Remedies ranging from Delay Damages and 
Performance penalties or rewards are good instruments for the investor to manage the appointed 
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turnkey contractor. However, in some instances the contractor is also an investor and this 
presents a potential conflict, then it is necessary to ensure effective segregation of responsibilities 
among the members of the investing consortium. 
What must be important to the contractor could be the degree of certainty relating to effectively 
evaluating and pricing the management strategies for each of these risks during the bidding and 
contract negotiation process prior to financial close. Bain (1996), highlighted that in the project 
finance environment the lenders prefer a degree of certainty around costs and will insist on lump 
sum turnkey contracts. This practice is not expected to have changed nor be treated differently in 
SSA context. 
What is of interest in the context of sub-Saharan Africa is twofold; how significant is project 
development risk in a PPP scheme, how is it allowed for in the feasibility and budgeting? How 
much value is placed on the contractor’s experience requirements vs. price in the adjudication 
process? Backhaus and Werthschulte (2006), found that capital  risk (project development cost) 
is most impactful in international Power, Industrial and Toll Road projects particularly because 
they tend to have predetermined fixed tariff structures based on the original capex assumptions.  
These then cover the main pre-completion risk considerations as per Figure 3: Risk Elements in 
PPP the Project Life Cycle. 
2.3.3  Supply Chain Risk 
A post completion risk related to access to a sustainable supply chain within the parameters of 
costs and specifications assumed in the project design, planning and development. This is 
relevant for input dependent projects like power plants, and industrial production facilities. Sudden 
loss of high grade coal supply for a coal fuelled power plant will impact production immediately 
and hence revenue and returns. Gatti (2008), discussed various options for managing supply 
chain risk in the form of long term contracts with suppliers and ensuring multiple backup options. 
In SSA Africa however the concerns would be with the overall development of the supply chain 
support system within the region of operation as discussed in Moyo (2012). Moyo discussed the 
constraints to production sustainability and growth in SSA industrial operations and though his 
study that related to operational risk it can be reasonably inferred that his conclusions have 
implications for input material supply chain where applicable.  
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2.3.4  Operational Risk 
Risk of sub-optimal project performance due to various contributors that cannot be managed 
through contractual arrangements related to supply risk as described in 2.3.3. These can result 
in cost inflation, down time and loss of revenue (Backhaus & Werthschulte, 2006; Gatti, 2008; 
Gatti et al., 2007; Moyo, 2012). Moyo (2012) specifically noted the risks presented by poorly 
developed overall utility support; water supply, power, and logistics & trade support and the impact 
they has on operations performance in SSA. His primary focus was on looking at manufacturing 
based businesses and the comparative performance of SSA economies, citing excessive 
transportation costs and reliability of utility services as an area of concern.  
2.3.5  Market Risk  
The importance of thorough market evaluation is stressed by authors of various studies 
(Ahwireng-Obeng & Mokgohlwa, 2002; Backhaus & Werthschulte, 2006; Bain, 1996; El-Diraby, 
2006; Klompjan & Wouters, 2002). Specifically ensuring that the affordability assessment for retail 
user based revenue models is addressed and that off take agreements with bulk buyers are in 
place. Market risk is also dependent on all global life cycle risks i.e. inflation, exchange rates and 
overall economic and political stability. Specifically (Backhaus & Werthschulte, 2006) found that 
sales revenue is a significant factor across all sectors of projects.  
Retail user based revenue models are common in the Road, Water and ICT infrastructure sectors, 
however data availability for user affordability assessments remains an issue and no literature is 
available at this point to indicate the extent of the issue in emerging SSA economies. Klompjan 
and Wouters (2002), found that the lack of effective external cover for market risk was one of the 
leading causes of credit default in project finance. In the case of a PPP this would be in the form 
of a guarantee from the procuring entity. 
2.3.6 Environmental Risks 
This risk runs across the full cycle of a project and relates to compliance to prevailing 
environmental law and adequately managing and environmental risk inherent to the project 
location.  Gatti (2008), considers environmental law compliance as within the scope of the risks 
to be allocated through the various forms of contracts in line with the stages of the project. There 
have been developments of compliance standards globally. The World Bank notes that various 
funding agencies have signed onto the Equator Principles code for environmental and societal 
impact and will not participate in projects that violate this code. This would be over and above 
whatever national codes exist and must be considered properly while budgeting. 
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This concludes the elements of risk that may be considered specific to pre and post 
commissioning, a look into the various global risks across the life cycle follows. 
2.4  Global Country Related Risk 
A series of studies into the global determinants of investability into emerging markets have been 
done and their findings are relevant to the SSA context. Ladekarl and Zervos (2004), classified 
three main areas of consideration for investors in emerging markets4.  
SSA boasts a number of the fastest growing economies in the world i.e. Nigeria, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Mozambique all with GDP growth rates in excess of 6% pa (BMI, 2013). Some SSA 
countries fit well into the accepted definition for emerging economies with growing financial 
markets, sustained take off growth and growing private sector investment participation (Nellor, 
2008). Of the main “Housekeeping and Plumbing”5 issues identified by Laderkal and Zervos 
macroeconomic stability, political stability, regulatory and legal environment are likely the most 
relevant to the long term infrastructure PPP environment.  
In order to establish standards in practice for evaluation and pricing of risk across emerging 
markets, Pereiro (2006) concluded that investors still accounted primarily for country risk at a 
global level through a country risk premium percentage in the discount rate6 and considered 
models designed for project specific exposure very rarely. 
What drives country risk in SSA? It is rather difficult to separate political stability and macro-
economic stability for emerging markets. An assessment of the overall stability of a state is the 
ideal place to start to understand the causality. The Institute for security studies (ISS) is 
continuously assessing the overall stability of African states along a series of parameters.  The 
fragility7 of African states as studied by Cilliers and Sisk (2013) within the ISS indicates that the 
at least a third of SSA states can be considered “fragile”. The Cilliers and Sisk (2013) study 
                                               
4 Note the study considered the process applied by investors (particularly fund investors) when formulating 
an investment strategy, the authors noted the significance of country political and social standing in 
determining viability. Countries with trade sanctions and social norms in conflict with investor principles are 
quickly removed i.e. Human rights protection, environmental protection etc. The study also highlighted the 
need for trusted data (country and market specific) to assist investors completing initial target assessments.  
5 Housekeeping referred to aspect of the quality country socio political financial and economic systems 
while plumbing referred to the efficiency of overall processes and rule of law.  
6 Pereiro also established that international investors are still primarily using classical investment evaluation 
methods such as the internal rate of return (IRR), net present value (NPV) and discounted payback period 
which are all valid for evaluating PPP projects. 
7 Fragility can be defined as low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and 
development. A state is fragile when it is unable to provide for the security and development of its citizens. 
The majority of citizens in highly fragile countries in Africa (1) are poor, (2) experience high levels of 
repeated or cyclical violence, (3) experience economic exclusion and inequality, and (4) suffer from 
poor/weak governance (Cilliers & Sisk, 2013) 
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focused on fragility trends going forward for countries in SSA. The grouping of countries on a time 
scale relating to their projected ability to improve across all criteria is represented in Figure 4: 
Sovereign Fragility Heat Map below. Highly fragile states are not projected to improve substantially 
by 2050. Political instability, violence, growing poverty and poor governance are likely to persist 
in these states. 2050 and 2030 target countries are forecast to show improvement within that time 
frame and take on characteristics of the more resilient states in the region. This study provides 
the basis for the discussion of global country risk elements. 
High risk countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), 
The Congo and Sudan have all experienced or are still experiencing internal conflict. Some 
countries have broken out of the conflict cycle and made significant progress toward stability and 
effective governing like Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. Researchers note that theoretically Nigeria 
qualifies as a fragile state from some measures; however its inclusion in stability forecasting 
models would skew the data due to its size. One would expect to find that Nigeria’s current internal 
conflict with Boko Haram and other security threats in the Delta region, as well as its history of 
poor governance and regulatory control could reflect negatively on its future prospects for 
investability in infrastructure PPPs. 
The outlook given by this report has a direct impact on various proposed regional infrastructure 
development and integration programmes. For the key sectors; the Inga Power Scheme in the 
DRC, the regional power pools and integrated trans-regional road and railway projects would be 
at risk. 
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Figure 4: Sovereign Fragility Heat Map 
 
 
The implications for overall regional or sub-continent level programmes are not explicitly found in 
literature. AfDB and Nepad (2013), have presented their proposal for the high impact projects, at 
a country level, regionally and higher. However, the extent to which these regional plans will be 
affected by these results is not quantified, especially from an investor’s perspective. 
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From the AfDB and Nepad (2013) PIDA report, below is an extract list of the project that are under 
consideration ranging from power project with a regional power pool focus to trade corridors 
across multiple states. 
The PIDA coordination agency is yet to clarify the real roll out structure for any that may be viable 
as PPPs and how they will be managed with the multiple stakeholders. 
 
Table 3: Select Regional Infrastructure Projects 
Identified Projects Sector Regional Exposure 
Abidjan-Lagos Coastal 
Corridor 
Transport Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire 
Dakar-Niamey Multimodal 
Corridor 
Transport Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger 
Praia-Dakar-Abidjan 
Multimodal Corridor 
Transport 
Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau,  Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire 
North–South Power 
Transmission Corridor 
Power 
8,000 km line from Egypt through Sudan, South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe to South Africa 
West Africa Power 
Transmission Corridor 
Power 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana. 2,000 km line along the coast 
connecting with the existing Ghana– 
Nigeria line with a capacity of 1,000 MW 
 
Historically, successful regional projects that can be referenced here would the South African-
Lesotho Highlands Water Project running since the 80s with a new phase already past feasibility. 
However those projects were never PPPs, they were publicly financed and managed through 
various agreements between the states. 
2.4.1 Political Risk 
Political risk refers to the stability of the political structures and processes within the state. This 
risk has a direct link to regulatory and legal risk. For the purpose of this analysis the focus will 
remain on the purely political processes and structures. The legitimacy of the state and the 
stability of its regime are expected to be important investability determinants for investors in 
infrastructure PPPs.  
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Political regime stability, electoral process and regime transition are issues of great concern to 
observers of African democracies (BMI, 2008, 2011; Crouzel, 2014; Girardone & Snaith, 2011). 
Crouzel (2014), noted that in a number of African countries, elections in recent years have not 
legitimized those in power, and have been the source of greater instability; the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2006),Guinea-Bissau (2008), Kenya (2007 and 2008), Lesotho (2007), 
Nigeria (2007), Senegal (2012), Togo (2005) and Zimbabwe (2008).  
In the assessment of the fragility of African states Cilliers and Sisk (2013) considered the 
implications in the medium to long term, of the threat of persistent poverty and lack of political 
inclusion in fragile African states.  
Cilliers and Sisk (2013), described the political paradigm in fragile states as follows; 
“In the context of more fragile states, every aspect of the governmental relationship is directly (and 
often personally) political. Separate institutions do not exist, the policy framework is uncertain, and 
the summary result is often far removed from the rational-legal processes and systems taught in 
courses dealing with political sociology. Many functions of governance are performed in ethnic or 
clan networks and through other informal faith-based institution.” 
 
 
The authors went on to conclude that the cycle of political violence in fragile states is very clearly 
self-reinforcing. The study summarized the general consensus in literature that states with high 
levels of poverty, a young populous, low literacy levels, high unemployment and political exclusion 
are likely and therefore political risk is high. 
Figure 5: Political Relationship in Fragile States 
 19 
 
The authors also noted what makes evaluating long term stability difficult may be that the desired 
improvements in economic growth rates – a prerequisite to building state capacity by providing 
increased tax and other revenues – may simultaneously increase the prevailing inequality and 
increase instability.  
It is worth highlighting the increased social instability caused by armed religious groups in both 
East and West Africa in recent years. Gounden (2013), notes the cases of conflict in Mali, Nigeria, 
Somalia and Northern DRC and their implications for long term predictability of stability in those 
states. Ever present ethnic group tensions in Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia will also be a going 
concern in the near future in these countries.   
Gatti (2008), highlighted the various forms of political risk in the context of PPPs. These range 
from continuous disruption due to civil unrest or terrorism, to the extreme cases of unilateral 
expropriation of assets by the state. Determining which risk is more relevant is difficult and the 
use of qualified risk evaluation specialists during project planning and execution is a priority.  
2.4.2  Macroeconomic Stability Risk 
Macroeconomic stability is a challenge for small open economies like most in SSA. The Global 
financial crisis hit African countries indirectly and over time as investors and donors consolidated 
assets back to their domestic markets and left capital markets in Africa. This worsened the 
performance of most markets as they have limited local depth to sustain themselves (Kasekende, 
2009; Lyakurwa, 2010; Taiwol, 2009). Dependency on commodity exports worsened as the global 
crisis saw slower production outputs and consumption and commodity prices fell. Losses in 
financial markets result in lower investor confidence and self-reinforcing growth decline and the 
financial crisis affected African stock markets noting JSE and Nigeria declines8.  
Kasekende (2009), emphasised the real issue for African Macroeconomic stability is the high level 
of undiversified export channels, dependency on aid and limited local financial markets depth. 
Governments are advised to adopt a dual stimulus and economic reform strategy with core focus 
on infrastructure improvement and business environment improvement9. Sovereign Credit Risk 
Ratings give a good indication of the overall economic stability of a country and key influencers 
range from fiscal stability, political and regulatory status and investor protection (BMI, 2011). A 
number of sub-Saharan countries have experience macro-economic instability in recent years. 
                                               
8 Some African economies were barely affected at all, like Ghana and Uganda due to the structural aspects of their economies and 
financial markets (having little to no exposure to Oil and focused on safe haven exports (gold)) (Taiwol, 2009). 
9 Zambia, Uganda, South Africa and Nigeria have all establish aggressive fiscal expenditure plans for infrastructure and specific 
regulatory reform for business operations, monetary expansion and taxation (Kasekende, 2009).  
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Most recently, Ghana’s failed monetary control policy resulted in substantial currency devaluation, 
toppling their short and long term Fiscal and Monetary policy outlook. 
Macroeconomic stability is important to PPP investment because it will have a direct impact on 
returns and an incremental impact on other risks as discussed. The literature lacks studies 
detailing the impact of macro-economic variables on project level returns. However Kodongo and 
Ojah (2011) studied the impact of currency risk on stock market pricing and concluded that 
markets did not price for currency risk. Similarly foreign investors in local projects in SSA must be 
exposed to a level of currency risk that needs to be accounted for in the budgeting and managed. 
2.4.3  Legislative and Regulatory Risk 
In the context of this study, these elements were considered purely for their effect on investability 
and the health of the business environment. There are limited academic sources of reflection on 
the state of the business environment and investability in SSA however, a good measure of a 
country’s suitability for investment and long term operations that could be used is the Doing 
Business Report (WorldBank, 2014). Therefore for the purposes of this review, information was 
drawn from those standard measures. 
Each sub-category included in the ranking framework is essential but there are those that give 
clearer understanding of the economy’s approach to support investment. These could possibly 
be used to rationally infer readiness for foreign direct investment by focusing on issues raised by 
studies on the key indicators for investors in emerging markets cited in this literature review 
(Ladekarl & Zervos, 2004; Pereiro, 2006). Therefore, using the parameters identified in the 
literature, as relevant the focus will be narrowed to the following indicators; 
i. Getting credit 
ii. Protecting minority investors 
iii. Paying taxes 
iv. Enforcing contracts 
Table 4: Ease of Doing Business Ranking: SSA Selected Economies includes the entire suite of 
rankings criteria. 
The selected criteria comprises the best independent view of the state of affairs on issues related 
to the strength of legal rights, protection of investors, financial market development and funding 
access, regulatory capacity, institutional efficacy particularly the legal system and policy 
suitability. These ratings however have a very real limit to their depth. They focus on domestic 
firms and their reflections on the business environment; they may not be a true reflection of the 
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industry experience from a foreign investor’s perspective. That is issues such as restrictions on 
foreign asset ownership, localization requirements, taxation nuances, capital controls and others 
are not included in this report. 
However, reflecting on the results as they are; one can draw the following conclusions; On issue 
(i) Getting Credit – RSA has the most mature and well regulated financial market system. Angola 
is the worst, with very poor legal structures and restrictive regulation. This could have implications 
for the ability to raise capital within the local market and even attracting foreign investors to the 
domestic market. On (ii) Protecting Minority Investors, RSA, Mauritius and Ghana are the best 
performers, while the worst performers are mostly the states ranked as highly fragile in Figure 4: 
Sovereign Fragility Heat Map i.e. Liberia and the Sudan states. The main issue here is the weakness 
of the disclosure requirements and segregation of responsibilities and the accountability of the 
board to the management. 
For criteria (iii), tax legislation and regulation, the best performers noted are Mauritius, RSA and 
Rwanda. These are countries with stable taxation policy supported by functional regulators and 
service departments. A country like Nigeria scores poorly on tax payments because of the 
weakness of the institutions charged with regulation and service provision. Mauritania is the worst 
ranked country in this category, with exorbitant tax rates as high as 71.3% total tax. 
And lastly, criteria (iv.), arguably the most important element in PPP arrangements is a country’s 
ability to support contract enforcement between parties independent of undue influence and 
clearly set out in common or civil law statutes. In this instance SSA’s best performer (Cabo Verde) 
is in line with the OECD countries’ average on timeline, cost and number of procedures. Angola 
is the worst across the globe according to this report. The stark variability across the sub regions 
introduces a further challenge for projects aimed at regional development and integration.  
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Table 4: Ease of Doing Business Ranking: SSA Selected Economies 
 
This selection was made in alignment with Figure 4: Sovereign Fragility Heat Map reference for the countries considered the most stable 
across the sub-continent.
Country 
Global 
Rank 
Regional 
Rank 
Starting 
a 
Business 
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits 
Getting 
Electricity 
Registering 
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Minority 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Resolving 
Insolvency 
Mauritius 28 1 3 26 1 14 3 2 1 1 2 2 
RSA 43 2 7 4 27 13 5 1 2 5 4 1 
Ghana 70 4 12 23 6 2 3 3 13 11 16 35 
Botswana 74 5 26 17 11 5 7 14 6 26 8 3 
Namibia 88 7 28 1 5 41 7 8 10 17 7 7 
Swaziland 110 8 25 8 22 23 7 16 7 13 41 6 
Zambia 111 9 8 21 14 31 2 7 9 41 17 10 
Mozambique 127 11 13 16 29 15 18 11 19 14 38 16 
Lesotho 128 12 14 36 13 10 32 14 17 22 20 22 
Tanzania 131 13 17 41 9 20 32 30 26 18 3 15 
Kenya 136 15 24 19 23 25 15 20 14 25 25 28 
Gambia, The 138 16 30 11 21 18 36 39 40 3 5 14 
Gabon 144 18 22 14 15 45 10 31 29 16 33 24 
Benin 151 23 16 9 35 36 15 28 38 12 39 18 
Senegal 161 29 10 33 43 38 18 20 43 4 27 12 
Malawi 164 31 29 12 41 8 32 27 15 37 32 37 
Burkina 
Faso 
167 33 27 13 38 28 18 20 28 39 31 18 
Nigeria * 170 36 19 43 46 47 5 5 39 28 26 27 
Angola 181 42 38 10 26 35 44 11 24 34 47 39 
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2.5  Risk Ownership in PPPs 
Risk allocation is the next factor that determines viability early on in the planning and development 
process. Page (2008), summarised the extent of risk transfer to the private sector through each 
type of PPP arrangement, as shown in Figure 6: Risk Transfer in PPPs (Page, 2008) 
 
Figure 6: Risk Transfer in PPPs (Page, 2008) 
 
 
Project finance modeling allows for various analyses to test the project’s sensitivity to risk event 
scenarios (Byoun et al., 2013). Byoun considered the implications for capital structure decisions 
from risk profile evaluation, concluding that, in practice, the level of leverage is a function of the 
risk profile and The World Bank PPP resource centre data indicates that current practice sees 
high risk SSA infrastructure PPP projects with capital structures ranging from 70/30 to 60/40 debt 
to equity.  
Ahwireng-Obeng and Mokgohlwa (2002), noted the principles in risk allocation; assigning the risk 
to the party best able to manage it and also matching returns to each party for the level of overall 
risk they bare. For example factors external to the project like socio-political risks are best left to 
the government while commercial and planning risks are best managed by the private party 
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assigned with project development (Ahwireng-Obeng & Mokgohlwa, 2002; Gatti, 2008; Gatti et 
al., 2007; Ke et al., 2012). There may be limitations to how well the risk allocation process may 
be conducted due to the limited experience of the industry in dealing with risk management in 
PPPs and in some instances conflicting objectives between the government, private sector and 
the eventual end user (Gatti et al., 2007). This literature outlines the logic followed in defining the 
risk allocation matrix of the project. The project work breakdown structure is one that works off 
the premise of discreet activities in different areas of the project and allocates responsibility for 
those. This identifies the main variables such as the technical issues, taxes and supply chain then 
follows on to define elements of risk within each main variable.  
The global risk breakdown structure logic is far more generic and considers the aspect of 
exposure throughout the project life cycle from external factors and internal milestones. This 
would cluster issues around country factors, operations and revenue for example. The 
intersection of these would then give a clear understating of the relevant risks for the project. 
A good example; taxation cost projection is a project issue which is directly related to country 
policy and regulation on a global level.  
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Table 5: Risk Allocation principles noted from Gatti (2008) 
Risk Owner and Risk Management Strategy 
Project Planning Risk 
Public entity/Project Originator – Accept and Manage through use 
of qualified transaction advisors 
Project Development Risk 
 Engineering and Design 
 Construction 
 Commissioning 
PPP Company –Further transferred through turnkey contract to 
a contracting company/consortium that may form part of the main 
project company or not. 
Project Operations & 
Maintenance Risk 
PPP company –partially transferred through O&M term contract 
to a suitably qualified O&M contractor that may or may not form 
part of the project company 
Market Risk 
PPP Company – Managed through term off-take contracts with 
anchor customers or time variant regulated tariff schemes for 
the retail market. 
Supply Risk PPP company – Managed through term supplier agreements  
Macro-Economic Risk 
 Inflation 
 Interest rates 
 Exchange rate  
PPP Company – Managed through selected financial hedging 
instruments depending on the level of exposure for the PPP 
company 
Political Risk PPP company – Partially transferred to insurers where possible 
Legal & regulatory Risk 
Shared – the exact extent of this risk depends on the contract 
terms with the public entity.  
Environmental Risk 
PPP Company – Partially transferred to various contractors 
within their scope 
Force Majeure Risks PPP Company – Partially Transferred to Insurers where possible 
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Practise dictates that commercial risk is allocated to the private party while socio political risk is 
carried by the public sector. 
An investor’s main concerns are the project’s ability to provide sufficient cash flow to yield a 
comparable return with assets of a similar risk profile. For an investor engaged as a lender to the 
project his primary concerns also include debt recovery and understanding the value at risk (Gatti 
et al., 2007). The cash flow requirements are well illustrated by the waterfall in Figure 7: Project 
Cash Flow Waterfall (Page, 2008). 
 
2.6  Risk Management Strategies 
PPPs are set up as special purpose vehicles with high leverage ratios and substantial risk to the 
funding agents backing the project (Bain, 1996; Einowski & Roek, 2007; Gatti et al., 2007; 
Klompjan & Wouters, 2002). Project finance and development is an international business, for 
emerging markets the capital and technical requirements may not be available in local markets.  
Some economic risks relating to the market driven transactions may be adequately hedged 
through options, forward contracts and futures. Demand side risk in some instances is hedged 
operationally through off take agreements (Einowski & Roek, 2007). Similarly, some input factor 
Figure 7: Project Cash Flow Waterfall (Page, 2008) 
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risk (e.g. fuel sourcing for Power plants) may be hedged through targeted long term supply 
contracts. 
The cost of risk management is a function of the accuracy of the risk identification and evaluation 
process. A reasonable hypothesis could be the more volatile the environment (economically, 
politically) the higher the cost of risk mitigation. Ahwireng-Obeng and Mokgohlwa (2002), noted 
that equitable allocation to suitably qualified parties substantially lowers the cost while noting the 
implications of impractical allocation of political risk to private parties as a key draw back.  
Technical risk mitigation cost could be a function of the experience of the project developer and 
his contractors. Below is a summary of the various risk mitigation strategies that may be 
employed, their validity is determined during the feasibility and bidding stages of the contract. 
 
Table 6: Typical Risk Management Strategies (El-Diraby, 2006) 
Risk management strategies 
Construction Risk 
Mitigation 
Economic Risk 
Mitigation 
Operating Risk 
Mitigation 
Political & 
Legal Risk 
Mitigation 
o Completion 
Guarantees 
o Performance 
Bonds 
o Avoid Scope 
Changes 
o Fixed Price 
Contracts 
o Contingency 
Funds 
o Standby Credit 
Facility 
o Experienced 
Project 
Developer 
o Liquidated 
Damages 
o Tariff Adjustment 
Formula 
o Forex Options 
o Inflation indexed 
product prices 
o Loan interest rate 
swaps 
o Exchange rate 
indexed product 
prices 
o Government 
guarantee for 
minimum revenue 
o Supplier 
Agreements 
o Forward Contracts 
o Off take 
agreements 
o Put and Call 
options on 
relevant securities 
o Performance 
based 
compensation 
system 
o Political risk 
insurance 
o Localisation 
in operations 
o Government 
guarantees  
 
 
As seen above, not all risk can be managed quantitatively through financial instruments and not 
all risk can be measured at inception and factored into the pricing. For example completion risk 
is transferred to the party responsible for the overall construction. In the case where major 
 28 
 
unknown risks are identified that need to be transferred off the books of the SPV, insurance is 
used. Insurance can cover anything from adverse unknown environmental events to design fault 
adequately for both parties (Bain, 1996; Blake, 2007; Gatti, 2008; Girardone & Snaith, 2011). 
Otherwise, where applicable contingent exposure hedging mechanisms are put in place during 
the project bidding stages and used throughout the delivery where relevant.  
Through the various construction contracts the risk is transferred to lower level parties and 
secured through performance guarantees. The prevailing public policy and access to financial 
market products contribute to the effectiveness of the strategies identified. 
2.7 Who are the Investors? 
Multilateral Funding Agencies like AfDB, The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
have played a significant role in support of SSA infrastructure development. These agencies also 
have developed and maintained the knowledge base for the region. However, for the initiatives to 
succeed, the investor pool must expand. The AfDB’s PIDA unit is assigned as coordinator of 
priority initiatives. Other organisations like the NEPAD Business Foundation’s Infrastructure Desk 
have also assumed the facilitation role. A measure of how successful these and other initiatives 
have been in engaging the private investors is necessary. These investors include the commercial 
banks, infrastructure development and operator firms and existing private equity funds. 
In a private public partnership, the public sector is the other key investor. The public sector’s ability 
to raise substantial capital to finance the development and lower the private capital requirement 
and make the project more attractive is a key factor. 
The role of the multilateral DFIs in sub-Saharan Africa has always been more than just as a lender, 
they have been coordinators or programmes (i.e. PIDA in AfDB) and taken on responsibility for 
capacity building in various sectors.  
The private sector however would have a wide selection of investor types with equally different 
objectives and scopes. These may include but are not limited to; 
i. Commercial Investment Banks whose primary objective would be to function as 
effective intermediaries and conduct project finance lending and equity investment across 
an array of sectors. There is no specific literature detailing the appetite of existing 
investment banking institutions for PPP project finance. The criteria for growth of the 
general banking sector detailed by Andrianaivo and Yartey (2010), would be applicable to 
investment banking operations. The protection of creditor rights, income level, level of 
repression and political risk are all relevant.  
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ii. Private Equity Firms are also on the rise in Africa (Andrianaivo & Yartey, 2010). They 
may provide the best source of project equity funding and with their global reach they play 
a significant part as conduits for international investors looking for long term investment in 
emerging markets.  
iii. Infrastructure Services Companies range from construction, product and technology 
suppliers, logistics firms, operators and engineering services firms. Their participation in 
PPPs comes as a part of their overall core business; however their role as an investor 
elevates their capacity requirement. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
The main objective of this study is to identify the key factors influencing investment viability and 
investor’s risk appetite in infrastructure PPP projects; overall the study will maintain a global SSA 
focus. This study relies heavily on the findings inferred from the literature review as a basis. 
3.1  Structured Interview 
The literature review informed the content of the structured interview undertaken with principal 
officers of organisations within the Infrastructure PPP industry. The interview’s main objectives; 
i. Identify risk considerations when evaluating PPP opportunities in SSA 
ii. Determine the  current perceived level of risk among the different groups of investors and 
how this compares to other mature infrastructure markets 
iii. Outline what the investor community would consider acceptable mitigation 
The interview was structured in two parts, a qualitative questionnaire and a quantitative risk rating 
schedule. 
3.1.1 Target Group 
The target organisations are all involved in infrastructure planning, investment, development and 
operation. Officers were selected on the basis of their role closer to project evaluation or strategy 
development and project execution. The target group included Banks, Private Equity Firms, 
Construction Companies, Engineering Firms, Advisory and Insurance Firms, Government PPP 
Agencies and Concessions Companies in operation in SSA. 
3.1.2 Qualitative Questionnaire 
The purpose of the qualitative questionnaire was to capture the organisation’s approach to the 
PPP industry and their perception of current and future potential. The questionnaire was 
discussed in two parts, firstly to assess their view of the maturity of the PPP industry and 
processes, governance and related institutions. The second part was to discuss how they would 
approach strategy formulation and project risk evaluation. Details of the questionnaire are 
attached in Appendix A. 
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3.1.3  Risk Rating Schedule 
From issues discussed in the literature review, a clustered schedule was created as shown in 
Table 9 Appendix C, to bring structure to the comments and ensure that a consistent measure 
was used across the sample and to maintain the soundness of the ranking system. 
Each interviewee was requested to then reflect on the inherent level of each risk element from a 
global SSA perspective, then comment on what he/she considers effective mitigation and re-rate 
the residual level of each element. Further to that, comments on the best practise allocation of 
that risk was required as well as a reflection on experience of best and worst in class across the 
continent. The latter was not limited to organisations but could extend to projects or programmes 
where the risk was either very poorly or very well managed. 
These schedules from the interviews were then consolidated into what could represent the 
consensus of the members of industry sampled and from this a conclusion of the key risk 
management determinants of investability for PPP projects in SSA could be drawn.  
There were important caveats noted prior to the commencement of the interviews that would 
impact the quality of the study.  There may be a potential sample bias presented by the target 
group’s regional distribution being mostly Southern Africa, particularly South Africa and the limited 
size of the sample. However, every effort was taken to ensure representatives from organisations 
in other regions were included and that organisations with a regional focus were the primary 
targets. 
3.2  Case Studies 
In order to align the research work to current practise, a small number of past and current PPPs 
were investigated with a focus on their process and development timeline, requirements and risk 
management frameworks. 
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Chapter 4: Results and findings 
 
The findings are presented in 3 parts; the investment approach of the private sector, the views on 
the maturity of the PPP investment sector, its processes and institutions and finally the main risk 
considerations. 19 interviews were conducted, out of an initial sample of 42 participants identified. 
The sample size and potential regional bias had earlier been identified as challenges; however it 
is noted that there is an apparent convergence in the views shared by the respondents and it 
gives confidence in the applicability of the findings across the region and with groups that could 
not be accessed. The respondents were investors and advisory and regulatory organisations in 
Southern and Eastern Africa. 
Figure 8: Groups of Participants 
 
4.1  Strategy approaches to Infrastructure PPP Investment 
 The objective of questions in this section was to identify the strategic value of the PPP model as 
viewed by investors either in public institutions as a solution to infrastructure delivery or to private 
sector investors as an opportunity. Below were the key questions posed? 
 How much is your organization involved in PPP infrastructure financing (or development) in SSA? 
 Briefly outline your PPP investment strategy development process? Is it Country driven vs. 
Project Specific vs. Sector Specific or a combination? 
 Is your level of involvement similar across countries in SSA? 
 What, would you say, are the factors that make your involvement similar/dissimilar across 
countries? 
 Which regions/countries in SSA do you consider the most viable for investment in PPPs? Why? 
53%
37%
10%
Research Participant Groups
Investors (Funds, Banks)
Investors (Contractors, Public
Institutions)
Regulators & Advisors
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 Which key infrastructure sectors in SSA are the most promising from an investment perspective? 
Why? 
Of the 19 participants, only 3 were not actively involved with the PPP industry for the following 
reasons; the first, a private equity firm was in the process of putting together an initial fund raising 
strategy to expand its core investment structure into infrastructure. The second, a leading 
multinational bank stated that in the short to medium it would keep its project financing activities 
focused on private development and possibly expand into private equity investments in 
infrastructure services firms in niche markets. Lastly, the third was a diversified property 
development firm based in South Africa and West Africa, though it expressed interest in growing 
into PPP investments for government properties, it had yet to formally engage the market. As 
shown below however, 84% of the participants were actively engaged with the PPP industry at 
varying levels. 
 
Figure 9: Participants’ Current Activity in PPP Market 
 
The objectives for investment in PPPs varied for different participants based on each one’s role 
in the value chain. Construction, Engineering & Operations firms (Contractors), or more broadly 
infrastructure services companies invest for two reasons; ensuring a secure pipeline of projects 
as the preferred contractor as well as creating non-core annuity income from the assets in the 
long term. The sample included only South African major contracting firms and each confirmed 
they had current projects in operation in the major toll roads or properties and also had projects 
under construction under the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme 
(REIPP). In response to the PPP involvement question, one Contractor, an integrated 
construction and engineering firm stated that “PPPs are a better method of procurement for major 
84%
16%
Participants Currently Active in PPPs in their Domestic Market
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projects in instances where varied engineering disciplines and industries interact, it is easier for 
us to organise ourselves if the requirement is made clear and we can manage risk better. We 
have had successful complex projects we secured as PPPs before and they continue to support 
our earnings annually”. 
The other portion of the operationally involved grouping of investors are the public institutions or 
originating owners of projects.  In this sample the respondent was a parastatal which owns and 
operate major public infrastructure in the transport sector. The participant highlighted the strategic 
relevance of PPPs for state owned companies as a means to bolster capacity and improve 
efficacy of infrastructure, noting its own institutional limitations in the form of human resources 
and capital to manage mass programmes and rapidly bridge the demand gap in the current 
market.  
The next group of participants were the financial investors; Banks and Private Equity Firms. The 
South African Banks have largely always had multidisciplinary project and corporate finance 
services teams and when opportunities presented themselves these would then focus on the 
infrastructure industry and the investments in PPP projects were largely in South Africa. With the 
introduction and growth of the REIPP in the past 5 years, participants commented that 
infrastructure project financing became a greater strategic issue and all noted that it was far more 
complex to execute, to extent where one participant confirmed that “Power & Infrastructure” 
project finance teams have been created within her organisation unlike in other banks where the 
teams largely still work through a multidisciplinary structure.  
Lastly, those private equity companies interviewed with a PPP specialisation look for opportunities 
aligned to their returns expectations and sectors of interest. A major investment fund indicated 
that for a fund to successfully invest in the PPP environment it needed to have dedicated teams 
and therefore strategically it preferred to invest through established private equity firms in the 
infrastructure sector. Participants noted that there is a growing number of highly specialised 
private equity funds.  
Responding to the question around regional footprint and barriers to expansion in other countries, 
none of the respondents responded positively to having a similar level of interest across SSA and 
only 42% of the participants responded positively to having a strategy with a regional focus or the 
intent to expand outside the domestic market, while the rest were observing the progression of 
the industry and had no aggressive strategy to actively pursue opportunities in the short to 
medium term. The private equity participants highlighted that there are now local and regional 
private equity firms which are primary infrastructure PPP investors and within this group of active 
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infrastructure participants all responded positively to what one respondent called “the pan African 
focus”.  
There are now more than 5 funds currently active in SSA that have been established as primary 
equity investors in infrastructure PPPs, though their depth is still limited and they are no more 
than 15 years old. The transaction advisors indicated they had no real limits to exporting services 
other than human resources. There has also been a diversification of service offerings by advisory 
firms into this space, with some specialists identified and working across the region as transaction 
advisors. All contracting firms confirmed interest in investing outside their home market. 
What would be the main strategy choices to be considered? From the literature a high level 
framework could be drawn up, which was done and was used as a basis for discussion on 
strategy, in the steps below: 
1. Defining tangible goals and objectives – focusing on the expected size of the investment 
pool, targeted returns and any other socio economic impacts desired. 
2. Identifying suitable ventures on a global level (sectors/countries/project types) for 
consideration through a process of elimination based on the risk return profile. Here some 
may apply exclusions based on fundamental principles defined in the founding of the 
company, in line with aspects discussed by Ladekarl and Zervos (2004). 
3. Identifying priorities based on the preferences outlined from the above. 
4. Raising the capital. 
5. Implementing ideal positioning strategies that include the value chain offering and 
potential partnerships. 
From the interviews, the strategy development process maturity varied though the following where 
considered by all participants as part of their decision making; target project sectors, geographies, 
resources allocated, identified prospects and the positioning strategy for priority initiatives.  
It was found that only 16% of the participants, specifically the specialised infrastructure private 
equity firms, could confirm having well defined targeted strategies detailing exclusions, financial 
returns benchmarks, short term project pipelines and investment horizons. Participant 
organisations lacked clear PPP investment strategies with defined targets. Contracting investors 
largely respond to the market opportunistically when bankable projects in select countries are 
released citing the lack of visibility and certainty on project timing as the major drawback to sound 
investment planning. One investor from the infrastructure sector highlighted the challenges his 
organisation has had with the cost of maintaining capacity to service PPPs in South Africa with 
no real opportunity outside of the renewable energy programme in the past 3 years. The 
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respondents representing contracting organisations with dedicated infrastructure investment 
divisions (20%) of the total group, confirmed that short term targets could not be clearly defined 
outside of the current REIPP because of timing uncertainty, making resource planning difficult. 
 
Figure 10: Participants Resourcing for PPP Participation 
 
This then presents a secondary challenge to investors around how to sustain internal capacity to 
support a strategy in a somewhat dry market as shown in Figure 10: Participants Resourcing for 
PPP Participation. 75% of the Contracting investors commented that though the financial 
investment resources could be raised on a project by project basis, the challenge is building and 
maintaining internal specialist people resources to engage solely in PPP deals is not feasible; and 
the necessity of this was confirmed through comments from one banking investment as stated. 
Therefore contractors structured their technical support resources to respond as and when called 
on by the originating institutions of the state. It could be inferred that this tactic has made the firms 
far less pro-active and less involved with project origination and planning, alienating the private 
sector from the process.  
Responding to the attractive sectors question, the 84% active in the infrastructure sector all 
agreed that physical economic infrastructure is considered the most viable sector for investment. 
This includes power plants, roads, ports, airports and bulk water projects. A further 50% of this 
group singled out Energy projects as having highest potential and far less barriers to investability 
improvements compared to other types of infrastructure. In support of this participants gave 
reasons including the growing energy deficit on the continent along with the relative capacity for 
coordination through central utilities and energy regulators in most countries. Rail and ports are 
next on the list in terms of potential but in their comments they were cautiously optimistic about 
53%
47%
Participants Currently Holding Dedicated Resources (Funds and 
People) to pursue PPP Opportunities
Yes No
 37 
 
timing and the coordination requirements for these largely regional initiatives. One participant, an 
industry regulator and advisor, commented on the viability of regional integration infrastructure 
programmes acknowledging that maintaining the vision of regional integration is far more relevant 
to the state than it is practical for investors. An area where investors displayed even more cautious 
optimism was the provision of social infrastructure, citing issues related to the maturity of the 
economies, end users and challenges encountered with conflicting ideologies over the role of the 
state. Various comments were made by the contracting and South African regulatory participants 
about the failed South African Prisons PPP programme (see Table 8: PPP Case Study 
Summaries which was largely due to this ideological debate. 
Lastly, which geographies are considered more viable for PPP implementation? It is first noted 
that the trend from responses of the 42% who considered themselves “regional player”, investors 
currently do not drive overall strategies to countries but rather sectors; however they have clear 
exclusions in terms of “no-go” countries. This list aligns entirely with Figure 4: Sovereign Fragility 
Heat Map countries listed as fragile in the long term. From the responses, it was concluded that 
these countries are considered prime for investment: South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria, 
these 4 were mentioned by every participant. These countries have a clear infrastructure deficit, 
relative long term political stability, improving institutional capability and process and prospects 
for growth. In the case of Nigeria, respondents’ sentiment in the short term varied. The contractors 
all considered the business environment too volatile to confirm active participation in the short 
term. All the bankers confirmed actively researching and tracking project finance opportunities in 
infrastructure but not having yet closed a deal. All comments on Nigeria noted that though there 
are concerns over state fragility and governance, the country cannot be ignored because it 
presents significant opportunity in the long run and investors were largely either actively 
participating in the Nigerian market with its difficulties in other investments or looking for a suitable 
local partner or acquisition as a point of entry. 
Currently the average PPP project value in the market ranges from US$100m - $250m with an 
average 5-year project development timeline to reach financial close and commence construction.  
 
4.2  Maturity of the PPP investment market; processes and institutions 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the PPP model, though old and tested in various countries 
across the world as discussed in the literature, it is fairly new and not growing rapidly in SSA. 
Understanding the status of the maturity of the industry i.e. quality of its supporting institutions, 
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governance and industry engagement mechanisms, is essential to effectively evaluating risk, the 
questions below were posed to participants; 
 What are the challenges/factors that have hindered optimal utilization of PPPs in the financing and 
development of infrastructure in SSA? 
 Comment on the aspects of the PPP roll out process that are critical for investability? (Issues can 
include legislation, coordinating agencies, procurement policies, project planning etc.) 
 How, in your view, might the barriers/challenges you have highlighted be addressed?  
 Who are the key role players and what actions are needed to address the challenges you have 
highlighted? 
This element of the study largely relied on the input from participants in the regulatory and 
transaction advisory field, just 10% of the total group. In these interviews the opportunity was 
taken to get specific views on the framework as described in the literature and how it can be 
applied in practice.  
The South African national treasury PPP Unit is tasked with regulating the PPP initiatives in South 
Africa. The agency has played a critical role in the development and implementation of legislative 
policy, procurement frameworks and governing processes and guidelines that have supported the 
growth of PPPs in South Africa. In discussions with officers within the organization on its mandate, 
role and challenges it brought context to the issues facing the entire industry.  
Firstly, the unit’s structure was built upon, and constantly strives to align with global best practice 
as described in the World Bank statutes for PPPs. Officers highlighted their belief that investor 
confidence is very dependent on transparency and predictability and there is a high degree of 
trust in the World Bank processes. The Unit’s mandate is as described in Table 2: PPP Agency 
Structures and Roles. The Unit supports and guides line ministries in the identification and 
formulation of PPPs through the stages outlined in Figure 2: Project Life Cycle whilst appropriately 
empowered and resourced to deal with what officers described as the design of technical and 
financial solutions and managing political processes that line ministries would be ill equipped to 
manage effectively. Describing its first core objectives as ensuring that the state gets value for 
money by conducting affordability assessments and ensuring good risk allocation. Secondly, 
running a codified process that gives investors certainty of legislative environment, high standards 
of work on feasibility studies which in turn will bring more confidence in certainty of returns. 
The importance of process definition legislative maturity and institutional technical capacity was 
then discussed with investor participants. Each participant confirmed that institutionally, South 
Africa is considered as the leader in the region in terms of mature processes and structures, with 
the success of the current renewable energy IPP programme, Gautrain and various transport 
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infrastructure projects cited as evidence. However, over 60% of the respondents also noted that 
confidence levels had severely dropped in recent years due to failed programmes like the Prisons 
and the debacle around the Gauteng e-Tolling initiatives. From the literature, we could infer that 
the successes of the South African industry is largely owed to the placement of the PPP Unit 
above line mysteries directly in the national treasury and also the level of authority given to the 
office.  
Respondents in the transaction advisory field also noted that Rwanda as a country headed in the 
right direction in this area having established a central agency following the World Bank 
guidelines. Countries cited as having real institutional challenges were Zambia, Tanzania both at 
the time had various proposed PPP programmes at early stages of planning and procurement. 
Each participant was asked to comment on the fragile states highlighted in Figure 4: Sovereign 
Fragility Heat Map (Cilliers & Sisk, 2013), all the financial investor participants indicated they would 
be unlikely to participate in limited recourse financing deals in any of these countries and 50% of 
the contractors indicated interest if the projects were 100% backed by the multilateral funding 
agents. Ghana has focused on the legislative enablement in the past 3 years and is now moving 
on to institutional capacity building; this led to the establishment of a PPP unit in 2014. 
From these responses we could reasonably conclude that investors place value and added 
confidence when dealing with states that have central agencies charged with setting up and 
managing PPP programmes and also empowered in line with World Bank best practice standards 
over the role of PPP units as discussed in Dutz et al. (2006). That is, an effective PPP unit is one 
that carries a regulatory responsibility with approval authority as well as considerable capacity 
and processes to ensure sound technical and commercial feasibility in the project structure and 
scope. This level of codification (citing examples from South Africa and Rwanda) has a direct 
impact on the level of investor confidence in the integrity of the processes.  
Further comments on investor experience with current programmes highlighted the current 
Tanzania PPP roll out in the ports sector as a good example of the challenges that may hinder 
effective application of the model. An initiative mentioned by 75% of the contracting investor 
participants and also 50% of the transaction advisors, it warranted further investigation. The Dar 
es Salaam port development project has attracted much international interest because of its 
potential as outlined in the detail pre-feasibility study commissioned by the Tanzanian Ports 
Authority (ECORYS, 2011). However the translation of the ports master plan into viable 
commercial offers to the market and management of the process has been a challenge. 
Participants were aware of the project’s issues and commented on the lack of clarity in the 
commercial structure, risk allocation and the quality of information provided to the market in the 
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recent bid for Berths 13 & 14. The study conducted by ECORYS outlined the main viability 
assumptions and actions the state would need to take in order to maximize the project potential 
such as; relocation of the adjacent Berth 12 Oil Jetty and aligning tariff structures for existing Port 
handling and storage facilities. One participant highlighted that the details in the bid have not 
clarified the status of those major issues in the pre-feasibility study, leading to uncertainty about 
the timing of the project and revenue risk allocation. Participants close to the project also indicated 
that the timeline allowed for the preparation and submission of bids was not feasible even if the 
information available to bidders was adequate. This leads to the issue of timing and effective 
project preparation because high impact major projects have a long lead time and involve multiple 
stakeholders, as evidenced by South Africa’s Gautrain Project, see Appendix B Table 7. 
The Gautrain case demonstrates the need for a highly coordinated approach for high impact 
multidisciplinary complex projects. It involved the consolidation of transport master plans and 
alignment of line ministry objectives in the Gauteng Province of South Africa. The project 
feasibility was commissioned in 2001 and financial close was only achieved 6 years later. The 
South African treasury ensured equitable risk allocation and ensured other policies were aligned 
and in place to ensure demand risk mitigation, specifically the introduction of urban tolling across 
highways in the region of the Gautrain. Further to this, the comments from the participants 
indicated that the project was a priority politically and enjoyed substantial political support till 
commissioning.  
In response to the questions about critical indicators of investability, discussed in the next section, 
investor respondents highlighted the need for quality feasibility studies and equitable risk 
allocation as a top priority. Noting that over 60% of them highlighted concerns over institutional 
technical capacity, it confirms that there is a need to supplement state capacity with adequately 
qualified professionals. The involvement of reputable advisors and professionals is recommended 
as part of best practice globally as discussed in the literature and 50% of the banking investors 
named it as a key indicator of investability and going further to note that inadequately prepared 
project tenders released do far more damage to investor confidence and perception. Tanzania’s 
challenges have dampened investor confidence in the port programme and participants were 
wary of the outcome of the current bidding process for the projects. The cancellation of the South 
African Prisons PPPs also left investors greatly concerned about the future of PPPs in the country 
and the current lack of a clear short term pipeline has not improved the perception. 
When asked to comment on regional initiatives, regulators and advisors highlighted that the 
timeline for PPP development is exceptionally long; the typical period from project identification 
and pre-feasibility to financial close is on average 5years. The regionally driven infrastructure 
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strategies are expected to face even more challenges gaining traction; with misalignment of 
objectives, capacity and risk across the countries. Though participants conceded the political 
prudence of the approach, practically it is seen as some distance away unless the stronger 
economies and multilateral funding institutions take on the majority of the risk and back these 
projects. Experience from previous SADC regional PPPs supports the basis for backing by the 
stronger economies i.e. The Maputo Corridor Project owed its success to the willingness of the 
South African government to back the entire project considering Mozambique’s fragility at the 
time. 
In discussions with respondents, it was apparent that the lack of institutional capacity and due 
processes is a major bottleneck in the development of a mature industry. The issues highlighted 
could be summarized as: (1) the processes and institutions behind the identification and planning 
of PPPs, (2) The lack of precedent in some countries to refer to as guidelines for processes and 
risk evaluation and (3) the inability of the public sector to clarify priorities and master plans for 
infrastructure development.  
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4.3  Indicators of Project Investability – Risk Considerations 
At this point it is clear which global and strategic issues investors consider when considering 
whether or not to participate in a PPP opportunity, and it is more useful to then look at how risk is 
managed, from identification, evaluation to effective mitigation throughout the project life cycle. 
The following questions related to issues more directly linked to risk management and it was duly 
noted that various examples of these risk issues had been discussed in 4.2; (note that this part of 
the discussion was heavily aided by the review and completion of the risk register set out from 
the literature and presented with guidelines, see Table 9: Risk Rating Schedule Template with 
Guidelines). 
 What are the major risks inherent in PPPs in the countries in whose infrastructure development 
your organization has participated? (Consider the clusters listed in the register) 
 Are these risks similar across all countries? If not, can you note any specific country differences? 
 Broadly speaking, what risk management strategies could you employ to mitigate the highlighted 
risks? 
 Do your risk management strategies involve the application of particular risk management products 
and contracts (e.g., Insurance, derivatives, forward contracts, turnkey contracts and long term O&M 
subcontracting)? 
 Are there instances where the domestic market limits the applicability of certain risk measures? 
How?  
 From which (offshore) markets do you then obtain these products? Would there be value in building 
domestic capacity for these products in the countries concerned? 
 Which one(s) of the risk management measures is critical to successful mitigation of top risks in 
SSA? 
From the review of critical success factors in executing the PPP model, it was expected that the 
country risk elements would be the major risk issues for investors. 
Responses to the comparability of risk and return of PPPs to other investment options in SSA 
varied slightly. It is important to note on the outset that drivers of risk differed for the participant 
grouping. All respondents commented that it is not easily comparable due to the added dimension 
of dealing with the state and political risk. The Advisors and Regulators stated commented that 
given a stable mature business and political environment, PPPs are lower risk because of the 
long term contracts and front end loaded risk profile. The bankers largely agreed though one 
noted the need with the statement but noted that the effectiveness of the project structure is the 
key to the risk profile despite the political environment. Contracting investors considered PPPs 
higher risk especially because of the level of direct balance sheet exposure for them if appointed 
as the development turnkey contractor.  
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Current Inherent Risk Levels to be considered – refer to Table 7: Risk Rating Result - Industry 
Consensus. 
The summarized risk register represents the consolidated response from participants interviewed 
and may be taken as a reflection of current perception, it reflects the average scores for each risk 
element. Risk management strategies were proposed as described and participants asked to 
comment on their effectiveness in the SSA context. 
Inherently in SSA, the biggest risks to PPP investment are; (1) Project Selection and Preparation 
(2) Country Risk – Legislation and Regulation and (3) Market Risk – economic viability and 
demand; each with an inherent risk level >15. Primarily what participants are saying through the 
register and their comments is: 
 Project Preparation – Probability (4) means investors felt they are more likely in SSA to 
find inadequately prepared projects (poor feasibility, unclear procurement procedure, 
poorly defined risk allocation structure), and that the impact on their part would be costly 
should they engage. 100% of contracting investors noted spending in excess of R15m – 
R25m on submissions for failed major project bids each year, hence the impact rating (5). 
 Legislation and Regulation – Probability (4) means investors felt they are likely to expose 
themselves to policy risk, corruption and contract enforceability risk in most African 
countries. This is primarily because in most, there is no precedent for PPP implementation 
and litigation to reference.  
 Economic Viability and Demand – Probability (4) meaning investors are likely to see offers 
where stability of revenues is not well covered because of market factors like income levels 
and affordability or the financial stability of the off-taker.  
Political risk is inherently a concern to investors, specifically regime change and stability; however 
it is viewed as declining across most countries, with only 10% of participants having rated high 
inherently.  
At the top of risk issues is the state’s ability to conduct project selection and preparation along 
with creating a mature and predictable legislative and regulatory environment for PPP investment. 
Without prejudice, investors conclude that South Africa’s PPP processes are the most effective 
comparatively, even with South Africa’s recent challenges in implementation and the unclear 
pipeline, while 20% then mentioned the strides taken by Rwanda. Participants reflecting on 
potential across SSA noted that East Africa’s potential rests in Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania. 
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On the issue of legislative and regulatory risk, Nigeria was one country singled out as a challenge 
as a key investment destination and high potential for infrastructure. One participant recalled a 
recent experience where negotiations for power purchase agreements fell through on challenges 
with governance and the eventual enforceability of the contract. Further reinforcing the status of 
Nigeria in the Table 4: Ease of Doing Business Ranking: SSA Selected Economies and its issues 
with historical and current contract enforceability and governance.  
Market risk is considered a going concern for public infrastructure investments in the developing 
economies of Africa; specifically the implications of retail market affordability assumptions and the 
state’s ability to step in and bridge the gap, though the risk is considered far lower in Power 
projects with term off take guarantees. The risk grows with the retail market revenue models of 
most toll projects for Rail, Roads and Ports. Participants currently considering the Tanzania ports 
project were concerned mainly about the allocation of the market risk and stability of the revenues 
in what they called a poorly defined model. 
Political risk is managed through various insurance products and participants from commercial 
banks and private equity have this as a non-negotiable requirement before proceeding with a 
transaction. Support from MIGA or their domestic Export Credit Agency is essential. The 
involvement of a multi-lateral institution like The World Bank or African Development Bank as a 
funder considerably improves confidence, this sentiment was supported by more than 50% of the 
investor participants. 
The technical and commercial risks (No: 6 – 10 on Table 7: Risk Rating Result - Industry 
Consensus are considered manageable through sound counterparty selection and transfer 
through the various contracts. Counterparty risk management was emphasised by one bank 
investor participant as the key to effectively managing the project development risk. PPPs are 
largely multidisciplinary projects and without a clear project pipeline to allow for the private sector 
to organise itself; the timeframe allowed for bidding is mostly inadequate to cover the detailed 
work that would need to be completed if the scope was unclear during prequalification or bidder 
selection, further adding strain to the bankability and financial closure process with the banks. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations  
5.1 Summary of Findings 
There is an even split amongst the investors on whether or not to consider country aspects first 
or the project specifics when reviewing an opportunity because the two are not mutually exclusive 
in this environment. This was discussed when looking at strategy considerations, it is only clear 
when it relates to geographical exclusions. Assuming the country assessment is first, respondents 
highlighted focus areas for risk evaluation: 
 The quality of the investment environment; how predictable is the business 
environment? Is the judiciary effective? The rule of law and protection of investor rights? 
What does historical precedent say about the state’s integrity and effectiveness in dealing 
with legal issues and contracts? Is Political Risk Insurance cover available as a starting 
basis? 
 The existence of a legislative framework; is there a PPP policy supported by the 
necessary laws in place? How predictable is the doctrine in the state? If it stable can they 
obtain adequate breach of contract cover at a reasonable cost? 
 Development of financial markets; considerations for the depth and regulation. How 
open is FDI regulation??  
As previously highlighted in strategy considerations, investor participants either excluded or 
included certain regions and sectors based on the assessment of their business environment prior 
to any project specific considerations.  
Secondly, should the country be found “adequately investable” participants then look into the 
viability of the project proposed and all the processes followed in its development and summarized 
as follows; 
 Project preparation; is the feasibility study of a good quality supported by a reputable 
transaction advisor? Is the funding structure feasible? Is the project part of a greater 
country infrastructure plan (priority assessment)? How stable is the source of income i.e. 
how bankable is the off take agreement or retail market? 
 Quality of governance; Are the institutions behind the project stable, transparent and 
empowered? Do they have the experience in managing PPP procurement? 
 Risk allocation and predictability; is the risk sharing structure proposed fair? Can the 
consortium adequately identify, quantify, price and mitigate the project risk in the time 
available for bid submission? With all risk considered (i.e. technical solution and 
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counterparty risk), is the project financeable? Are all the required risk management 
products and tools accessible? 
 Long term sustainability; what is the risk of future dilution from competing service 
provision projects? Chances of other game changing events throughout the term? 
Considering the infancy of the industry and the institutional and legislative challenges facing SSA 
countries, investors have largely responded opportunistically in the past. There is a growing 
industry of Private Equity Investors and specialized transaction advisory firms specializing in the 
sector. Overall the private sector interest is not waning, and governments can expect a 
competitive response from the market if managing the processes well. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Infrastructure Public Private Partnerships are a key component of service delivery strategy in 
many developing and developed countries. Their future in SSA rests on the government’s ability 
to create an environment stable enough for meaningful private sector participation. Building 
political will, improving legislative and regulatory process and institutional capacity should be at 
the top of the agenda. Lessons that can be learnt from the experiences of South Africa Kenya 
and Rwanda could shorten the learning curve overall. Consideration of the best practise statutes 
should not be taken lightly from a policy and regulatory structure perspective. Providing a clear 
country level infrastructure priority master plan gives opportunity pipeline visibility allowing for the 
private sector to organise timeously. All these actions will help build up investor confidence as a 
start. A further review of how to better use resources and programmes started by the multilaterals 
funding agencies is needed at a regional level and could be coordinated through organisations 
like the African Union or NEPAD. 
There is further potential for quantitative study into existing risk return profiles for active 
investments in various countries with or without the characteristics highlighted to test the real 
correlation between perceived risk and actual return.  
Further study into the drivers of growth in Independent Power Producer investments across the 
region is necessary as this was identified as a core focus area for all actively investing 
participants. 
A study into the actual financial depth limitations of regional financial markets with access to 
international markets in providing capital to infrastructure initiatives is necessary, if only to identify 
what the main bottlenecks are to growing the regional capital pool using the more mature financial 
markets like South Africa as conduits for international private capital. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
Countries with real opportunity in the medium term like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana 
need to align to the above recommendations where they still have gaps and capitalise on their 
growth, stability and the improving state of their business environments. The fragile states require 
more support from multilateral institutions as providers of political risk insurance and funders to 
encourage private sector participation. As multilaterals, the AfDB and World Bank, may have a 
theoretical level of political leverage based on the resource base they control and influence they 
have over the state and that can be used to accelerate project development and transaction 
closure by showing capital is available and providing guarantees. 
The findings do not contradict past studies on risk allocation such as Ahwireng-Obeng and 
Mokgohlwa (2002) but it does highlight what matters for sub-Saharan Africa in terms of 
investability indicators for this sector. As detailed by Ladekarl and Zervos (2004), the macro level 
issues are still relevant but there are more processes related to the project planning and 
development that need better consideration. 
This study focused on summarising the key aspects of risk identified from the literature related to 
the industry and reflecting on where SSA is along that risk management and process 
improvement continuum using qualitative insights gathered through interviews with a select group 
of industry players. It has confirmed that the main risks to investment in PPP projects in SSA are; 
Project selection and preparation by the state, Maturity and efficacy of legislation and regulation 
in the sector and the market viability in the long run. 
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Table 7: Risk Rating Result - Industry Consensus 
  
Risk Element Includes such Consequences Main Causes  
Inherent 
Rating Mitigation Strategy 
Residual 
Rating  Allocation 
Best in 
class  
Worst in 
Class 
  P I Level P I Level 
                            
1 
Project Selection and 
Preparation   
Corrupt tendering, inadequate 
specification and contract 
alignment 
 (1) Inadequate Project preparation 
and development of commercial offer 
(2) Lack of skills in public 
administration 
4 5 V-20 
 (1) Development of central PPP 
coordination agencies with adequate 
governing authority (2) Involvement of 
qualified and reputable transaction advisors 
2 5 H-10 Government 
RSA, 
Rwanda 
PPP 
Agencies  
Tanzania,  
Ethiopia 
2 
Country Risk: Legislation and 
Regulation  
Policy stability, regulatory capacity 
and control (Taxes, contract 
enforceability) 
Lack of Policy stability, regulatory 
capacity and control (Taxes, contract 
enforceability) 
4 5 V-20 
Breach of contract cover (PRI) where 
practical, legal opinion (local counsel) and 
clear precedent availability.  
3 3 H-9 
Government/ 
ECA/MIGA 
Rwanda, 
Zambia, 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
3 
Market Risk: Economic 
viability and Demand  
Retail market affordability, 
government fiscal support capacity 
 Lack of due diligence of marketability 
of revenue model, market shifts in the 
medium to long term (competition, 
political position) 
4 4 V-16 
Allocate through the off take agreement or 
government support for gaps identified in 
the retail market whichever is applicable. 
3 3 H-9 Government     
4 
Country Risk: Political 
Stability  
Inclusivity, democratic rule,, 
Protection of property rights, 
expropriation 
In country political fragility (poverty, 
illiteracy, factionalism etc.), no 
established political ideology related to 
the role of the state, dysfunctional state 
departments etc. 
3 5 V-15 
Political risk insurance (PRI) through MIGA 
or Export Credit insurance. Involvement of 
a multilateral funding agency in project. 
2 4 H-8 
Shared/ 
Insured 
 
All “red” 
states in 
SFA10,  
Zimbabwe 
5 
Country Risk: Macroeconomic 
stability 
Exchange rate volatility, inflation, 
financial markets and systems, 
interest rates, sovereign credit 
profile 
Highly volatile exchange rate regime, 
inflation, under developed financial 
markets and systems, high interest 
rates, deteriorating sovereign credit 
profile 
3 4 H-12 
Short term hedging through market 
instruments, long term risk allocated to 
government through Tariff recovery 
contracts. Cover for convertibility and 
transferability through facilities from MIGA. 
2 2 M-4 Shared 
RSA, 
Nigeria 
Ghana, 
Zimbabwe 
6 
Project Development: 
Construction 
Achievement of milestone dates, 
managing productivity and labour 
Limited counterparty experience, 
logistical difficulties, external 
disruptions, skills etc. 
3 4 H-12 
  
Strong counterparty experience and 
financial capacity. Sound contractual 
agreements with recourse for non-delivery. 
Define project engagement frameworks 
with local communities at feasibility. 
2 2 M-4 Contractor    
7 Global Force Majeure Risks 
Natural disasters, wars and acts of 
terrorism, civil unrest  
 - 3 4 H-12 Insurance coverage where possible. 3 2 M-6 Insurer     
8 
Project Development: 
Technology/Commissioning 
Achievement of specified output 
and plant performance 
Selection of untested technology, 
availability of support infrastructure, 
alignment of input specifications to 
technology etc. 
2 5 H-10 
Strong counterparty experience 
(technology supplier). Ensure scope covers 
critical support infrastructure provision 
either through state or own. 
1 5 M-5 Contractor    
9 O&M: Supply Chain Risk 
Materials sourcing, export & import 
support 
Lack of local input sources, 
underdeveloped trade support 
infrastructure, restrictions on 
importation of capital goods etc. 
2 5 H-10 
Contractor tasked with O&M to cover 
commercial and operations risk at this 
stage.  
2 2 M-4 Contractor     
10 
Project Development: Design 
and Planning  
Design adequacy and planning 
adequacy, constructability  
Limited counterparty experience, 
protectionist in country localisation 
legislation 
2 4 H-8  2 2 M-4 Contractor     
Note: Ratings legend is attached in Appendix C 
 
                                               
10 SFA – State fragility assessment as per Figure 4: Sovereign Fragility Heat Map 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire  
Questionnaire Part 1 – PPP Development Process and historical experience 
i. How much is your organization involved in PPP infrastructure financing (or development) 
in SSA?  
ii. Is your level of involvement similar across countries in SSA?  
iii. What, would you say, are the factors that make your involvement similar/dissimilar across 
countries?  
iv. Which regions/countries in SSA do you consider the most viable for investment in PPPs? 
Why?  
v. Please comment on the aspects of the PPP roll out process that are critical for 
investability? (Issues can include legislation, coordinating agencies, procurement policies, 
project planning etc.)  
vi. In your opinion, have countries in SSA optimally utilized the private sector to realize 
development objectives in the infrastructure financing context?  
vii. [If the answer to (VI) is NO, what are the challenges/factors that have hindered optimal 
utilization of PPPs in the financing and development of infrastructure in SSA? 
viii. How, in your view, might the barriers/challenges you have highlighted be addressed?   
ix. Who are the key role players and what actions are needed to address the challenges you 
have highlighted? 
Questionnaire Part 2 – Approach to project risk evaluation 
i. How does risk in a SSA PPP compare to other investment opportunities in the sub-
continent? 
ii. Briefly outline your PPP investment strategy development process? Is it Country driven 
vs. Project Specific vs. Sector Specific or a combination? 
iii. What would you summarize as the key indicators for investability of a PPP in SSA?  
iv. Which key infrastructure sectors in SSA are the most promising from an investment 
perspective? Why? 
v. What are the major risks inherent in PPPs in the countries in whose infrastructure 
development your organization has participated?  
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vi. Broadly speaking, what risk management strategies could you employ to mitigate the 
highlighted risks? 
vii. Are there instances where the domestic market limits the applicability of certain risk 
measures? How? Where do you go for alternatives? 
viii. Which one(s) of the risk management measures is critical to successful mitigation of top 
risks in SSA? 
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Appendix B: Case Summaries 
Table 8: PPP Case Study Summaries 
Project Project development Timeline Key Stakeholders Investment Value & 
Financing Structure 
Risk Allocation Awarded  Party Key Success Factors  
(or Failures) 
  Name and Role     
Gautrain  
South Africa 
 Treasury approval of feasibility 
study 2001 
 RFQ 2001 
 RFP April 2002 
 BAFO April 2004 
 Preferred Bidder Award June 
2005 
 Effective Date September 2006 
 Financial Close January 2007 
 Province of Gauteng 
acting through 
Department of Roads 
and Transport 
 Nationals Department 
of Transport 
 National Treasury 
R24bn estimated capital 
expenditure including R7bn 
fiscal support. (2007 Terms) 
 Demand Risk – Shared 
 Operating Risk – 
Concessionaire 
 Development Risk - 
Concessionaire 
Bombela Concession 
Company, Shareholders  
 Murray and Roberts 
 Bouygues Travaux 
Publics 
 Bombardier 
 Strategic Partners 
Group 
 J&J Group 
 Strong political support 
 Strong project team 
 Continuity in PPP process 
 Project developed as 
transport and economic 
development project 
Prisons PPP  
South Africa 
 1st Registration September 2003 
 Deregister 2006 
 Re-register July 2007 
 TAI for feasibility study issued 
September 2007 for 4 3000 bed 
high security Prisons: Paarl/East 
London/Klerksdorp/Nigel 
 TAIIA RFQ issued October 2007 
 5 Submission received; 4 
Consortia shortlisted 
 TAIIA- RFP issued October 2008 
 Bid Submissions  May 2009 
 Evaluation – not started 
 Department of 
Correctional Services 
 PDNA and Kagiso 
Financial Services 
lead advisors. 
ZAR1.2 billion investment per 
prison in 2007 terms. 
25 year DBFMO inclusive of 
the provisioning of Custodial 
Services 
90/10 Debt Equity split. 
 Demand risk –Government 
 Operating Risk – 
Concessionaire 
 Construction Risk – 
Concessionaire 
 Change in Law – 
Government 
 
Policy Review undertaken by 
Department in2010.  
Outcome required material 
changes to the RFP 
Projects cancelled by 
Department 
 
 Changes in political and 
executive leadership in 
Department impacted 
decision making and 
sentiment towards PPPs. 
 Market confidence suffered 
as a result of the cancelling 
of projects.  
 Huge losses for market in 
terms of development costs. 
 Impact on other PPP projects 
that came to market after. 
 Policy debate was ongoing 
when projects released  
 
Tanzania Ports 
Development – 
Dar es Salaam 
Port Berths 13 & 
14 
 Project identification 2006/7 
 Ports master plan published 2008 
and advisor appointed for pre-
feasibility study  
 Pre-feasibility Study Published 
2009 
 Berth 13&14 RFQ/EOI Sepember 
2014 
 Berth 13&14 PPP Tender January 
2015 
 Anticipated Tender Submission 
March 2015 
 Anticipated Award July 2015 
 
 Tanzanian Ports 
Authority 
 CPCS Transcom 
International pre-
feasibility consultant 
 No bankability study 
provided 
 No advisor officially 
linked to the current 
procurement process 
Design-Build-Operate-Transfer 
25yr Concession 
 
Estimated at US$350m total 
project development cost. 
Anticipated Debt/Equity ratio 
65/35. 
 Demand risk – 
Concessionaire 
 Construction risk – 
Concessionaire 
 
TBD 
10 Prequalified Bidders in 
January 2015. 
 TBD 
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Appendix C: Risk Rating Template with Guidelines 
Table 9: Risk Rating Schedule Template with Guidelines 
 
 
 
P I Level P I Level
1
Project Selection and 
Preparation  
Corrupt tendering, inadequate 
specification and contract alignment
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
2
Project Development: Design 
and Planning 
Design adequacy and compliance to 
all laws, constructability 
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
3
Project Development: 
Construction
Achivement of milestone dates, 
managing productivity and labour
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
4
Project Development: 
Technology/Commissioning
Achievment of specified output and 
plant performance
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
5 Country Risk: Political Stability 
Inclusivity, democratic rule,, 
Protection of property rights, 
expropriation
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
6
Country Risk: Legislation and 
Regulation 
Policy stability, regulatory capacity 
and control (Taxes, contract 
enforceability)
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
7
Country Risk: Macroeconomic 
stability
Exchange rate volatility, inflation, 
financial markets and systems, 
interest rates, sovereign credit profile
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
8 O&M: Supply Chain Risk
Materials sourcing, export & import 
support
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
9
Market Risk: Demand and 
Pricing 
Retail market affordability, government 
fiscal support capacity
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
10 Global Force Majeure Risks
Natural disasters, wars and acts of 
terrorism, civil unrest 
1 1 L1 1 1 L1
Residual Rating 
Allocation Best in class 
Worst in 
Class
Risk Element Includes such Consenquences
Inherent Rating
Mitigation Strategy
Probability 
Rating 
Probability (Frequency) Description   
1. Rare 1% chance of occurrence during the project The event may occur only in exceptional circumstances 
2. Unlikely 3% chance of occurrence during the project The event could occur at some time 
3. Possible 
10% chance of occurrence during the 
project 
The event should occur at some time 
4. Likely 
33% chance of occurrence during the 
project 
The event will probably occur in most circumstances 
5. Almost certain 
100% chance of occurrence during the 
project 
The event is expected to occur in most circumstances 
    Impact (I)         
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 (
P
) 
  
1. 
Insignificant 
2. Minor 3. Moderate 4. Major 
5. 
Unacceptable 
5. Almost certain M-5 H-10 V-15 V-20 V-25 
4. Likely M-4 H-8 H-12 V-16 V-20 
3. Possible M-3 M-6 H-9 H-12 V15 
2. Unlikely L-2 M-4 M-6 H-8 H-10 
1. Rare L-1 L-2 M-3 M-4 M-5 
Impact Rating 
Financial Impact Loss 
of Profit Increased 
Capital 
Time or Schedule 
Delays/Improvements 
b. Performance/Output 
1. Insignificant   ≤ 1% of Project value  
 ≤ 1% of Project 
Duration  
Robust well defined 
system, well 
implemented with very 
rare failure. 
2. Minor 
 > 1% but ≤ 4% of 
Project value or . 
 > 1% but ≤ 4% of 
Project Duration  
System deviation 
(Occasional failure).  
3. Moderate 
 > 4% but ≤ 6% of 
Project value   
 > 4% but ≤ 8% of 
Project Duration  
System defined and 
implemented but failing 
regularly (repetitive 
failure.  
4. Major 
 > 6% but ≤ 10% of 
Project value  
  > 8% but ≤ 10% of 
Project  
System defined, not 
implemented (system 
failure - one cause).  
5. 
Unacceptable 
  > 10% of Project value 
  > 10% of Project 
Duration 
No system (Significant 
system failure - multiple 
causes). 
 
